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Since the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan in 2010, the G20 has 
tried to promote market integrity and a clean business environment. Under 
the German G20 presidency, a working group co-chaired by Germany and 
Brazil has been seeking to advance this agenda. Since the so-called Odebrecht 
scandal – a large-scale corruption scheme that entangled most Latin Ameri-
can countries – the relevance of the topic has become widely recognised.
 • Latin America was a frontrunner in intergovernmental anti-corruption treaties. 
Nevertheless, corruption is still deeply engrained and widespread in Latin Amer-
ica. Governments from various ideological backgrounds are currently under scru-
tiny due to corruption charges. 
 • Corruption in Latin America has not increased in recent years, but the exposure 
and social disapprobation of corruption has. In many Latin American countries 
democratisation has failed to cope with organised crime and social marginalisa-
tion – both of which are important drivers of violence and corruption. 
 • The exceptional cases of Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica provide evidence of the 
key role elites, state institutions, and democratic accountability play in coping 
with these problems.
 • Direct consequences of anti-corruption campaigns and scandals may be ambiva-
lent as they delegitimise institutions and the political system. This might open 
the floor to outsiders and populists, resulting in deeper institutional crises.
Policy Implications
While international initiatives against corruption such as the G20 Anti-Corrup-
tion Agenda can serve as important reference points, strengthening the inde-
pendence of judicial systems and civil society organisations in monitoring cor-
ruption and enforcing existing laws should be a priority. The subordination of 
economic and political elites to the rule of law is a must for anti-corruption pol-
icies as well as for sustainable development.
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The Changing Contexts of Corruption 
Corruption is a major issue in international, regional, and national debates. The Or-
ganisation of American States (OAS) was the first to adopt an anti-corruption con-
vention in 1996. It was followed by other regional and international organisations 
– notably, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
1997 and the United Nations (UN) in 2003. The G20 established an anti-corruption 
working group in its first meeting at the 2010 summit in Toronto. The current work-
ing group is co-chaired by Germany and Brazil – ranked 10th and 79th, respectively, 
in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The rationale behind 
the G20 anti-corruption agenda is that “corruption threatens the integrity of markets, 
undermines fair competition, distorts resource allocation, destroys public trust, and 
undermines the rule of law. Corruption is a severe impediment to economic growth, 
and a significant challenge for developed, emerging and developing countries.” [1] 
Anti-corruption mechanisms such as the OAS and the UN use a broader approach 
and link corruption explicitly to the legitimacy of public institutions. In this respect, 
the anti-corruption treaties of these organisations can contribute to enhancing the 
legitimisation of both national and international governance (Narlikar 2017).
Even though corruption standards, corruption legislation, and people’s percep-
tion of corruption change, there is an emerging consensus on the negative impact of 
corruption on economic development and democratic accountability. Both aspects 
are closely interrelated, and – due to persistent social inequality and asymmetric 
political power relations – the latter is at the core of the current corruption scandals 
in Brazil and other Latin American countries. These states are breeding grounds for 
old and new patterns of populism, clientelism, and patrimonialism. The lines be-
tween these phenomena and corruption are blurred. Anti-corruption mechanisms 
focus on the illicit appropriation of public resources for private gain, but twisting 
existing legislation for private or political gain is a closely related phenomenon. The 
most widespread related practices consist of:
 • influencing political processes such as elections through campaign contribu-
tions (either to political parties or specific candidates) or by using state funds 
to give preferential treatment to specific electoral constituencies
 • paying bribes to those employed by state institutions (police, judiciary) in order 
to circumvent legal rules
 • paying bribes in order to get access to public contracts such as infrastructure 
projects. 
Despite its long tradition in Latin America, corruption has only been a prominent 
topic since the region’s political regimes began to democratise in the 1980s. Thus the 
series of infamous corruption cases that swept the region in the 1990s do not neces-
sarily indicate that corruption increased during that time frame but could rather 
reflect increasing public awareness and controls in democratic political regimes 
(Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017; Weyland 1998). The spread of national chapters 
of Transparency International and the adoption of the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption was a result of this growing awareness in Latin American soci-
eties. Unfortunately, the region remains a place where the rules are not enforced 
(Franco and Scartascini 2014). Why should one expect a different outcome in re-
gard to anti-corruption laws?
1 The G20-Anti Cor-
ruption Working Group 
(ACWG), www.bmjv.de/
G20/DE/ACWG/G20_
node.html (30 May 2017).
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Corruption and high levels of violence are still major problems across Latin 
America – though there are significant regional variations (see figures 1 and 2). [2] 
It is interesting that variations along both topics single out the same group of 
countries: Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba. These four states have low levels 
of homicide and high levels of corruption control. Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay 
perform well on a wide range of governance indicators and score high as democratic 
regimes. Cuba’s positive performance might be down to a lack of independent data 
or an authoritarian regime’s successful control of corruption and violence. But the 
vast majority of Latin American countries still face serious problems. How can we 
explain this?
Democratisation has failed to deal with two important drivers of corruption 
and violence: (a) organised crime, particularly the drugs trade, and (b) high levels 
of inequality (e.g. income inequality and inequality in access to state and public 
policies). Furthermore, there is a lack or complete absence of effective policies in 
the fields of prevention, rule of law, and social inclusion; although their influence is 
rather indirect, they are also important. 
Various combinations of factors shape the degree of corruption and violence as well 
as society’s response to these phenomena. Institutional capacity and an independ-
ent judiciary are key for non-violent conflict transformation and the enforcement 
2 The Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicator (WGI) “con-
trol of corruption” captures 
“perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private 
interests” (Kaufmann et al. 
2010: 4). Values between 
-2.5 and 2.5 signal either 
weak or strong govern-
ance based on different 
sources, such as public 
opinion surveys and expert 
assessments.
Figure 1: 
Corruption Control  
in Latin America  
(Average 1996–2015) 
Source: The World-
wide Governance Indi- 
cators, 2016 Update 
(09/23/2016), http://
info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/#home 
(11 May 2017).
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of the rule of law, whereas civil society and independent media are important for 
demanding accountability and transparency. Meanwhile, social inclusion policies 
are a major mechanism of prevention. All these factors are also relevant for trust in 
public institutions and their levels of legitimacy. 
A government’s economic performance is crucial to the levels of mobilisation 
and protest a country experiences. These levels are higher in times of recession and 
lower during phases of economic growth (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017). The re-
cent corruption scandals in Guatemala and Brazil reveal the complex interplay of 
different factors.
Guatemala – Impunity Past and Present
Corruption in Guatemala stems from high levels of impunity which are closely re-
lated to the gross human rights violations that occurred during the civil war, when 
the indigenous population was the main target of state repression (CEH 1999). After 
the war ended in 1996, Guatemalan political, economic, and military elites opted to 
maintain the repressive and exclusionary status quo instead of strengthening state 
institutions such as the judiciary. Impunity is not limited to wartime crimes but per-
sists. After Philip Alston – the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or 
arbitrary killings – visited the country in 2006, he stated that “Guatemala is a good 
place to commit murder because you will almost certainly get away with it” (United 
Nations General Assembly 2007: 20). In the following years international pressure 
to combat organised crime and impunity increased. In 2007 the International Com-
mission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) was established with the mandate to 
support the Attorney General’s office. The CICIG played a key role in uncovering the 
influences of criminal organisations on elections and party politics via direct and hid-
den campaign financing (CICIG 2015). Two dedicated general prosecutors – Claudia 
Paz y Paz (2010–2014), a former human rights activist, and Thelma Aldana (2014–
present) – helped to strengthen and professionalise the judiciary by introducing a 
series of reforms and sending symbolic cases to court. The most important case was 
the genocide trial against Rios Montt, the former president and a former general. 
Montt was subsequently found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity in 
May 2013, but the Constitutional Court overruled the verdict 10 days later due to 
political pressure. 
Corruption levels reached a new high during the presidency of Otto Pérez Mo-
lina (2012–2015), a former general who was elected on a hard hand agenda against 
crime. The first allegations of corruption started to surface early on, but it took 
more than three years for protests to emerge. In 2015 a combination of economic 
crisis, a lack of public policies to mitigate gross social inequalities, and a severe 
hospital crisis led an array of actors to mobilise against government corruption. 
In April 2015 there were a series of corruption scandals, known as La Linea, which 
involved President Pérez Molina, Vice President Roxana Baldetti, and most of their 
ministers diverting money from the customs agency and into their private accounts 
at an estimated rate of over USD 300,000 per week (InSight Crime 2016). 
Despite the protesters’ success in bringing down the corrupt government, it 
is far from evident that Guatemala has reached a tipping point. For instance, the 
brother (and long-time business partner) of President Jimmy Morales (2016–pre-
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sent), a former comedian who ran on the slogan “neither thief nor corrupt,” is cur-
rently facing corruption charges as is the president’s son. Nevertheless, public pro-
test has calmed down – at least until the next bigger scandal erupts.
Brazil – Lava Jato and the End of Impunity
The current corruption scandal in Brazil, which will be discussed below, might be 
a turning point in the fight against corruption in Latin America. For the first time, 
top executives and high-ranking politicians were charged and convicted (and given 
lengthy prison sentences) by an independent judiciary and under pressure from 
civil society. Moreover, testimony offered in exchange for reductions in sentences 
made it possible for investigators to uncover the workings of a well-established, 
continent-wide kick-back scheme. 
Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) is Brazil’s and perhaps Latin Amer-
ica’s biggest ever corruption investigation. It started as a money laundering en-
quiry [3] in 2014 but uncovered evidence of a kickback and bribery scheme in the 
state-run oil company Petrobras. Investigators allege that Petrobras executives were 
accepting bribes in return for awarding contracts to construction firms at inflated 
prices. The bribes were then split between Petrobras executives, middlemen, and 
political parties for campaign funding (particularly among those that supported the 
government). The investigation into this case of corruption remains open, but total 
pay-offs may exceed USD 5 billion (Padgett 2017). 
As part of the enquiry, Brazilian investigators began to focus on construction 
contractors. They uncovered a cartel in the lucrative and growing Brazilian construc-
tion sector, which was sharing out contracts and rigging prices on various projects 
(e.g. big infrastructure projects, the FIFA World Cup, and the Olympic Games). Con-
strutora Norberto Odebrecht S.A., the biggest engineering and contracting company 
in Latin America, was revealed to be at the centre of the corruption allegations, thus 
transforming the scandal from a Brazilian affair into a Latin American affair; in fact, 
there were also criminal proceedings in the United States and Switzerland. [4] 
Disclosures relating to Lava Jato and Odebrecht were only made possible by 
using “rewarded collaboration” (colaboração premiada), which was formalised in 
Brazil with the Organised Crime Law of 2013 (Nicholson 2015). This tool allowed the 
judiciary to offer reduced sentences in exchange for detailed confessions incriminat-
ing the architects and other participants of criminal activities. While this procedure 
is not beyond criticism, it was the only viable strategy to identify the politicians and 
businesses involved in this extensive corruption network. Moreover, due to the fact 
that politicians in office enjoy certain judicial privileges, Brazilian investigators tar-
geted businesspeople first and then used their confessions against politicians. 
In March 2016 Marcelo Odebrecht was sentenced to 19 years in prison. Later, 
he and 77 other Odebrecht executives agreed to act as key witnesses for the state in 
exchange for reduced sentences. During court proceedings, it was revealed that the 
company had a secret branch to manage illegal payments (totalling USD 800 million) 
for securing government contracts in at least 12 Latin American countries. The brib-
ery scheme covered the whole political spectrum, from Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela to 
Ricardo Martinelli’s right-wing government in Panama (El País 2017). Even the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) received payments from Ode brecht. 
 
 
3 The operation was 
named after a service sta-
tion in Brasília where some 
of the pay-off cash was 
laundered. 
4  In December 2016 
under the Foreign Cor- 
rupt Practices Act, Ode- 
brecht agreed to pay  
USD 3.5 billion in global 
penalties for its role in the 
USD 800 million bribery 
scheme (Washington Post, 
22 February 2017).
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During the last Colombian election in May 2014, the campaigns of both President 
Santos and his main competitor Oscar Zuluaga received funding from Odebrecht. 
In Peru three former presidents are under investigation. Meanwhile, in Brazil the 
Supreme Court authorised the investigation into over 100 leading politicians in April 
2017. Furthermore, five former Brazilian presidents have been implicated as has the 
country’s current president, Michel Temer. Although these revelations could lead to 
Temer being impeached, it is worth noting that court-type evidence is not decisive in 
impeachment trials, which are typically political decisions that depend on political 
majorities (Llanos and Nolte 2016). Dilma Rousseff, for instance, was removed from 
office by impeachment because she had lost support in Congress; she was accused of 
administrative manipulations but not of corruption. The current Brazilian president 
will survive as long as there is no majority to depose him.  
The Odebrecht scandal has the classical ingredients for corruption: companies 
with state participation (Petrobras), big infrastructure projects decided by public 
tenders, illegal party and campaign financing, and private enrichment by politicians 
who commit their crimes in a historical context of impunity and judicial privileges. 
The scandal also demonstrates that as Latin American companies internationalise 
their activities, both corruption and the criminal prosecution of corrupt politicians 
become transnational activities. In February 2017 the general attorneys of 15 coun-
tries involved in the Odebrecht investigations met in Brasilia.
The Basis of Accountability – Elites and State Institutions
Transparency International has always classified Chile, as well as Costa Rica and 
Uruguay, as one of the few Latin American countries with a low corruption score. 
Why is Chile different? There seems to be a certain path dependency going back 
to late colonial times and the period of early state building in Latin America. For 
most of its history, Chile is characterised by the probity of its political class and 
strong political institutions (Silva 2016). During the twentieth century, Chile had 
strong and non-corrupt technocratic state agencies, an independent judicial system, 
and efficient controlling state institutions such as the National Comptroller Agency 
(Controlaría General de la República), which was created in 1927. The only excep-
tion in regard to probity and corruption control was the Pinochet regime, which was 
characterised by the personal enrichment of the dictator, his family, and his inner 
circle. These corrupt practices had been concealed at the time and subsequently 
created tension between Pinochet, who was still commander-in-chief of the army, 
and the new democratic government. Under democratic rule since 1990, Chile has 
returned to its historic trajectory by (i) strengthening independent control mech-
anisms through, for example, creating the positions of an independent national pros-
ecutor (fiscalía nacional) and a special prosecutor for safeguarding fair competition 
(fiscalía nacional economíca), (ii) promulgating new legislation to guarantee public 
probity, (iii) increasing transparency, for example, in regard to public procurements 
and access to government information, and (iv) regulating party financing, because 
illegal campaign finances and not personal enrichment have been a major issue in 
many corruption scandals. The recent increase in the number of cases regarding il-
legal campaign contributions are not evidence of growing corruption (as data about 
corruption victimisation demonstrate; Aninat and González 2016) but rather of more 
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efficient prosecution and a more demanding civil society (Navia 2015). Chileans have 
a very low tolerance for corrupt practices within the public sector, and there seems 
to be a growing willingness to denounce cases of corruption (Ramírez and Vinagre 
2016). At the same time, the issue of corruption formed a key part of many electoral 
campaigns, which resulted in a higher perception of corruption that was only par-
tially related to a real increase in corrupt practices (Aninat and González 2016). This 
campaign tactic also had the unintended consequence of damaging the image of the 
entire political class in the eyes of the Chilean electorate (Silva 2016). 
Uruguay and Costa Rica share some similar traits with Chile. In all three coun-
tries, institutions and party competition matter, and they are the only Latin American 
countries with high judicial independence in a recent study by the Inter-American 
Development Bank. They are also the best-ranked countries in a more comprehensive 
index that measures government capabilities (i.e. congressional policymaking cap-
abilities, party system institutionalisation, judicial independence, and civil service 
cap acity) (Franco and Scartascini 2014). In Uruguay the judiciary is fully independent 
from the executive, and the Contentious Administrative Court (Tribunal de lo Conten-
cioso Administrativo) is also strong (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014). During most of the 
twentieth century, a strong state exerted a monopoly of force throughout its entire ter-
ritory. Despite featuring a decades-long patronage-based, clientelistic party system, it 
seems that corruption was never a pervasive practice in Uruguay. The clientelistic sys-
tem really began to slowly change in the 1990s with rise of more programmatic parties 
and greater competition. Moreover, as a political strategy, clientelism could no longer 
be sustained economically. Anti-corruption legislation did not change politics but was 
the result of a political change that sought to strengthen the control of the administra-
tion and prevent corruption by regulating political practices and the bureaucracy in a 
new context of programmatic competition (Buquet and Piñeiro 2014). 
Costa Rica is an example of a country that gradually developed and strength-
ened its institutions and mechanisms of accountability (Wilson and Villarreal 2015). 
This process started in the nineteenth century by giving autonomy to the judiciary 
from the executive branch and laying the basis for a system of separation of powers. 
Another important step was the country’s 1949 constitution, which created a weak 
presidency in regard to presidential powers, a strong and independent Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal, and new audit agencies such as the Office of the Comptroller 
General (Controlaría General de la República) and the Attorney General (Procura-
doria General de la República). In 1989 the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Court was created and became one of most powerful courts in Latin America. At the 
beginning of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the institutional framework 
of accountability was consolidated with additional laws. Moreover, citizen partici-
pation increased and restrictions on the media were lifted. Two former Costa Rican 
presidents (Miguel Angel Rodriguez and Rafael Angel Calderon) convicted of cor-
ruption have been given custodial sentences. 
The Relevance of International Anti-Corruption Regimes 
International assistance for democracy, the rule of law, the judiciary, and civil society 
has played an important role in democratic governance and accountability for the 
last three decades. International treaties are a major point of reference for reform-
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oriented actors inside the state apparatus as well as in civil society. Hence, while the 
levels of corruption in Latin America might not have greatly changed, the region’s 
tolerance of corruption has diminished, and the enforcement of existing legislation is 
increasing. Social change and new legislation that enhances both the transparency of 
public policies and the accountability of office holders are important drivers of pro-
test (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017). While both democratic and  non-democratic 
governments have signed international anti-corruption regimes, democracy does 
make a difference. First, the chances are higher in democracies that international 
and regional treaties will be translated into national legislation. Second, democratic 
governments seeking re-election are more dependent on process-oriented patterns 
of legitimacy. Transparent and accountable procedures do matter.
Is the glass half empty or half-full? There have been great advances in the fight 
against corruption, but endemic corruption persists in many countries. While dem-
ocracy – or democratic accountability – is not a cure-all for corruption, it does di-
minish the chances that corrupt practices will remain undiscovered. It is not by 
accident that Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay – which have been classified as the 
most democratic countries in Latin America for most of the twentieth century and 
the first two decades of the twenty-first century – are recognised as the least corrupt 
and least violent countries. At the same time, the deterioration of the standards of 
democratic accountability leads to the concealment of acts of corruption and subse-
quently to higher levels of corruption as the case of Venezuela illustrates. In parallel 
to the degradation of democratic controls in Venezuela starting with Hugo Chávez 
and culminating under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela saw its ranking in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index decline and became the most corrupt 
country in Latin America. While Venezuela is also involved in the Odebrecht scan-
dal (and received with USD 98 million the highest sum of bribes from Odebrecht 
outside of Brazil), it is the only country where not the perpetrators but rather the 
journalists reporting about the scandal were prosecuted. In contrast, Chile reacted 
to several corruption scandals in 2014 and 2015 by the government and Congress 
approving several anti-corruption laws in 2016, including one on political party and 
campaign financing. Thus, how politics and the judiciary react to corruption scan-
dals reveals a lot about the quality of democracy in a country. 
Contrary to authoritarian regimes, democracies feature a specific variant of cor-
ruption: illegal party and campaign financing. This was a major ingredient in the 
Brazilian Car Wash and Odebrecht scandals. Illegal party and campaign contribu-
tions reflect the rising costs of elections. Therefore, the implementation and en-
forcement of laws that regulate party and campaign financing can be an important 
step to reducing corruption. 
In most countries democracy has not reduced social inequalities. However, social 
inequality was a less contentious issue in the period of spectacular economic growth 
in Latin America that was fuelled by the commodity boom, which made possible ac-
tive (but not re-distributional) social policies. Poverty rates decreased and the income 
sectors categorised as middle class increased; but corruption prevailed and inter-
mingled with clientelistic practices. With the end of the commodity boom, poverty 
rates began to rise again, and the middle classes experienced or feared a loss of sta-
tus. Although resources for clientelistic politics and campaign goodies have become 
scarce, there is still enough money for personal enrichment and to bribe politicians. 
However, these practices are now being confronted by angry and mobilised citizens.
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In the long term the public exposure and criminal prosecution of corrupt polit-
icians should strengthen democracy. But in the short term and medium term the 
consequences might be more ambivalent. Corruption scandals can diminish trust in 
political institutions and reduce support for democracy. While the electoral punish-
ment of parties and politicians linked to corruption is understandable and justified, 
the loss of trust in politicians and the implosion of party systems might facilitate 
the rise of outsiders and populists. Guatemala is a relevant case with regard to this 
argument. There is no guarantee that replacing a discredited political elite will in-
crease the quality of democracy. For example, the beneficiary of the mani pulite 
anti-corruption campaign in Italy was Silvio Berlusconi. Even though it is necessary 
to reveal corrupt practices and denounce corrupt politicians, the media and polit-
icians have a special responsibility to not overplay or politically use the corruption 
issue, which might be tempting in electoral campaigns. The result of such actions 
might not be less corruption and a better democracy but the contrary. 
International anti-corruption mechanisms such as the one provided by the G20 
are important because governments bind themselves, at least formally, to transpar-
ency and accountability. Implementation, democratic control, and accountability 
need strong civil society actors and independent judicial institutions. 
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